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Abstract: 
 
New and rich panel data for a large and representative sample of firms are used to estimate the 
sensitivity of access to capital to differing ownership structures. The investment behaviour of 
firms is examined in a dynamic setting in the presence of adjustment costs, liquidity 
constraints and imperfect competition. The empirical work is based on the derivation of Euler 
equations in the presence of symmetric and quadratic adjustment costs and both debt and 
equity constraints. Whereas the norm is to use ad hoc approaches to model these constraints, 
our alternative and more consistent leads to the inclusion of financial variables in investment 
equation in first differences rather than in levels. Our GMM estimates confirm the importance 
of financial factors in determining investment rates and suggest that firms owned by insiders, 
especially non-managerial employees, are more prone to be liquidity constrained than are 
others. Among the other groups, somewhat surprisingly, only domestic outsider owned firms 
display sensitivity to both measures of the availability of finance, with manager owned firms 
being sensitive to the availability of external finance, while state owned firms being sensitive 
to the availability of internal finance. 
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1.Introduction 
 
The importance of liquidity constraints in firms’ real investment decisions has long been the 
focus of economic research (Stein, 2003). The literature finds that access to capital is not 
unlimited and is determined by the degree of informational asymmetries and agency costs. 
The large empirical work has focused on identifying indicators at the firm level, such as 
dividend payout ratios, bond rating, degree of bank affiliation, membership in financial 
conglomerates, firm size, firm age and/or governance structure, that approximate for the 
severity of capital market imperfections and explain the observed differences in investment 
behavior across firms1. In this paper, by using a rich panel data for a large and representative 
sample of firms, we investigate the investment behavior of a sample of Estonian firms during 
the period 1993 through 1999 and make several contributions. 
 
Fundamentally, we provide new empirical evidence on a topic that has attracted the attention 
of theorists but for which there is little empirical evidence --the impact on investment of 
alternative governance structures. The study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, 
it introduces and empirically tests a novel way of how financial variables enter a structural 
dynamic investment equation. Second, it accounts for the effect of governance structures in 
investment decisions through their role in mitigating or exacerbating informational 
asymmetries and agency costs. Third, it assesses the long-run viability of certain ownership 
forms. This is an important issue in light of the continuing debate in the literature on the 
efficiency of various ownership forms resulting from the extensive privatization process in 
almost all former centralized economies. Fourth, in a more general context, it contributes to 
the debate in the corporate governance literature on the effect of governance through 
ownership.  Finally,  the results of this analysis allow us to answer questions such as how 
pervasive are liquidity constraints in Estonia and the extent to which different  governance 
structures are likely to be financially constrained. These answers, in turn, provide directions 
where public policy should focus in terms of designing effective policies to promote 
successful restructuring on the part of firms. 
       
                                                 
1 This literature, which started with the seminal study of Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988), is large and it 
would require a book in itself to review it in detail. Other studies in this area are, for example, Hoshi, Kashyap 
and Scharfstein (1991), Whited (1992), Oliner and Rudebuch (1992), Schaller (1993), Galeotti, Schianatarelli 
and Jaramillo (1994), Petersen and Rajan (1994), Bond and Meghir (1994), Hubbard, Kashyap and Whited 
(1995), Kaplan and Zingales (1997), Hu and Schianrarelli (1998), Hadlock (1998), Cleary (1999) and Goergen 
and Renneboog (2001).  
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The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the following section we outline the 
testable hypotheses and present the specifications to be estimated in the empirical work. The 
next two sections focus on sample construction and data description, and the estimating 
strategy and presentation of empirical results. In the last section we conclude with some 
policy recommendations. 
 
2. Governance Structures, Firm Size, Investment and Liquidity Constraints 
 
The extensive literature on investment behavior has not much to say on the role of different 
governance structures on investment decisions, with the reason being that most of the 
empirical studies are based on samples of large publicly traded firms where ownership is 
vastly dispersed and managers enjoy high degrees of discretion2. In the process of 
decentralizing their economies, in many countries the movement away from state ownership 
has led to the emergence of diverse forms of ownership. On many instances insiders3, i.e., 
employees and/or managers, have majority or dominant ownership or, even when they 
possess minority ownership, enjoy substantial degrees of control. The existence of such 
diverse governance structures allows testing of various theoretical propositions regarding the 
efficiency of different owners in capital allocation and in monitoring management.  
 
Various arguments point to firms under insider ownership facing higher likelihood of being 
more constrained in raising capital than others. The literature on employee ownership, 
summarized in Dow (2003), stresses a host of factors such as member’ wealth position, their 
time horizon, risk attitudes, goal structure and the structure of property rights4 in the firm that 
make employee owners prefer taking the residual in the form of higher income rather than 
investing it in the firm. This preference, along with employee owners’ potential aversion to 
                                                 
2This is, especially, the case for samples drawn from Anglo-Saxon countries, i.e., from the US, the UK and 
Canada. 
3 Some clarification is in order here with respect to the terminology we use. The term insiders used in the 
literature on transition economies refers to both managers and employees who in a way or another have become 
owners or shareholders of the enterprises they worked before the start of transition. For those not familiar with 
this literature the use of this term might be confusing given that the same term is used in the more traditional 
analysis of western firms to refer only to managers. In the paper whenever we use the term insiders we refer to 
both managers and employees. 
4 The traditional analysis of employee ownership assumes that employee owned firms are characterized by 
collective ownership and non-transferable individual rights. An important development in transition economies 
is that, in most of the cases, employee owners are share owners, i.e., they own part of the firm on an individual 
basis and are able to trade shares in the capital markets. However, these firms still retain a strong degree of 
collective ownership by imposing limits on share trade. Evidence of this is provided by, for instance, Kalmi 
(2002) for Estonia. In a field survey of firms under insider ownership the author reports that in only 6% of his 
sample there are no restrictions on share trading. Furthermore, in 92% of the cases insiders are asked to offer 
their shares first to current shareholders.  
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accepting new members, leads to potential goal conflict between insiders and outside 
providers of both equity and debt capital. In addition, the fact that most of these firms are 
small and not listed in the stock markets exacerbates informational asymmetries and makes 
access to desired capital more difficult. The net effect of the interaction of these factors could 
be that outside investors might be reluctant to invest in employee owned firms or, when they 
do invest, the risk premium they charge is substantially higher than the market one. Overall, 
disincentives to invest internally and barriers to raise capital externally might lead to 
employee owned firms under-investing.  
 
The literature on managerial ownership stresses that an initial increase in managerial 
ownership is beneficial because it better aligns the interests of managers and shareholders 
and, consequently, lowers managerial discretion. However, at high levels, managerial 
ownership5 is associated with entrenchment and divergence of interests between managers 
and shareholders. In transition economies, managerial shareholding in post-privatization 
ownership configurations, in the form of majority, dominant or minority shareholders, is 
substantial. The possibility of entrenchment and subsequent rent seeking or asset stripping 
behavior on the part of managers has been an argument against managerial ownership 
(Djankov, 1999). The likelihood of this happening depends to a large extent on managers’ 
outside career opportunities and portfolio diversification, the way they obtain shares and the 
efficiency of market for corporate control. When outside career opportunities do not exists 
and managers have invested most of their human and financial capital in the firm, they will 
try to hold on to their equity share by following policies, including investments, which will 
increase their job security. Furthermore, manager’s behavior might be fundamentally different 
depending on whether he/she acquires the firm through a managerial buy-out (MBO) or gets it 
either for free or in the framework of a voucher-funded privatization. If the ownership is 
gained through one of the latter two cases, the manager might perceive it as a windfall gain 
and consume it faster than earned income (Djankov, 1999). On the contrary, MBOs serve as 
screening mechanisms that allow only highly qualified, growth oriented managers to become 
owners6. Finally, markets for corporate control serve as disciplining devices for managers. 
Yet, in an environment of high uncertainty and infantile capital markets, informational 
                                                 
5 The models on which these conclusions are based start from zero managerial ownership and then consider the 
dynamics once managerial ownership increases. However, the definition of low and high managerial ownership 
should not be taken as meaning majority (dominant) versus minority managerial ownership. High managerial 
ownership could be considered a stake around 10%.  
6 Financing of an MBO often requires external financing and only qualified managers might be able to raise 
external finance. 
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asymmetries might lead to adverse selection problems in the market for corporate control 
(Earle and Estrin, 1996). Overall these arguments imply that, in a transition economy, 
ownership concentration in the hands of managers is likely to lead to managers’ 
entrenchment, which in itself exacerbates informational asymmetries and leads to more 
expensive external finance and less investment.  
 
Agency problems arise when managers control, but do not own, the firm. Under these 
circumstances the identity of outside owners is crucial with respect to their ability to curb 
managerial discretion. For the purposes of this study we classify outside owners into three 
sub-groups: the state, foreign owners and domestic outside owners. The efficiency of each 
owner in disciplining management results in differences in managerial discretion across firms, 
which, in turn, results in differences in access to capital and investment behaviour. High 
degrees of managerial discretion mean that managers could engage in unprofitable investment 
projects or even in projects with negative present value that are valuable to them and lead to 
their entrenchment. Moreover, high managerial discretion accentuates the degree of 
asymmetric information and makes external finance more expensive. The outcome is reliance 
on internal funds, which results in investment being highly sensitive to the availability of 
internal finance. 
 
When majority or dominant owners are foreigners, who possess enough experience and 
resources to engage in effective monitoring, managerial discretion is kept at minimal levels. 
Further, given that foreign owners have access to their parent company’ resources and/or to 
international capital markets, investment behavior of foreign owned firms is not expected to 
be constrained by the availability of either internal or external finance. When majority or 
dominant owners are domestic outsider investors the degree of effective monitoring depends 
on the identity, number and size of investors. Depending on the combination of these factors 
several scenarios might arise. For instance, if ownership is concentrated in the hands of a few 
big institutional investors with experience, resources and low coordination costs, then 
effective monitoring will arise. Alternatively, if ownership is dispersed in the hands of a large 
number of small investors, then managers are more likely to enjoy substantial discretion in 
pursuing their objectives. Finally, when ownership is concentrated in the hands of the state7 
                                                 
7 As Shleifer and Vishny (1997) point out state ownership can be viewed as relation between a principal and two 
agents. The principal are the individuals (citizens), who are the ultimate owners of the firm. Being dispersed they 
have no ability and resources to monitor the state, i.e., the politicians and bureaucrats, who act as the first agent 
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managers will possess virtual control of the firm and enjoy high degrees of discretion in 
pursuing their interests.   
 
A further determinant of investment behavior and access to capital is firm size. Smaller firms 
exhibit larger degrees of information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders. In addition, 
these firms also face higher costs in issuing new equity. If these factors are significant then 
small firms are expected to rely more on internal funds. Agency costs may also be greater for 
these firms, raising further the cost of external financing. Overall, small firms are expected to 
rely more on internal funds than larger firms. 
 
In testing the propositions firm’s investment behavior is modeled in a dynamic setting in the 
presence of adjustment costs, liquidity constraints and imperfect competition, similar as in 
Whited (1992) and Bond and Meghir (1994). The firm, at every point in time, is supposed to 
maximize the discounted present value of future after-tax dividends as follows8: 
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where t represents a time index, Et denotes the expectation operator that is taken based on all 
the information available at time t, ( )sst θβ +=+ 1/1  is the discount factor at time s with 
sθ being the nominal discount factor at time s and 1=tβ at time t, and stands for after-tax 
dividends at time t. The model is solved subject to a flow of funds constraint, capital 
accumulation constraint, dividend non-negativity constraint and a credit ceiling constraint
tD
9. 
 
Equation (1) models the firms as dividend (profit) maximizers. Yet, while dividend 
maximization is a good approximation of firm behavior for certain groups of firms, it might 
not be appropriate for others (Ward, 1958, Dow, 2003). It is often argued that insider-owned 
firms would maximize income per worker rather than profit or dividends. The substantial 
insider power, especially employee power, in transition economies would make dividends per 
                                                                                                                                                        
and who in themselves have to monitor managers, the second agent. Both agents have usually objectives quite 
different from those of the principals and they can easily collude to pursue their objectives at the expense of the 
principals. 
8 Except for the time index the firm’s maximization problem has to be written with a firm identification index. 
Given that it plays no role in altering the solution to the problem, in order not to complicate notation that index is 
dropped.  
9 The solution of the model is presented in Hobdari (2003). 
 5
worker maximization seem the more appropriate objective function than total dividends 
maximization. Consequently, the model is solved for alternative objective functions and tests 
are performed in the empirical work to determine which of them better approximated firm 
behaviour. The equations to be estimated are the following: 
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Equation (2) is derived under the assumption that firms are dividend maximizers, while 
equation (3) is derived under the assumption that firms are dividend per worker maximizers.  
 
3. Data and Sample Description 
 
The data employed in this study cover a large and representative sample of Estonian firms 
over the period 1993 through 1999. The data consists of ownership configurations, obtained 
from surveys, and of financial information from firm’s balance sheet and income statements 
reported to the Estonian Statistical Office. The firms included in the survey scheme are 
selected as a stratified random sample based on size and industrial affiliation. For the 
purposes of the analysis firms have to be classified into ownership groups. Yet, this 
classification is not a trivial pursuit. Often firms are misclassified among ownership groups 
because important information contained in ownership variables is overlooked (Filer and 
Hanousek, 2002). In the Appendix we present a detailed account of how ownership structures 
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are defined. After correcting for data inconsistencies10, the merging of ownership and 
financial information creates an unbalanced panel of 3294 observations to be used in the 
analysis. 
 
Table 1 provides information on the distribution at a given point in time and evolution over 
time of the number of firms that fall in a given ownership category using dominant ownership 
classification. Focusing on the 1995 sample, it is apparent that, in more than 22% of cases, 
insiders, i.e., employees and managers, or former insiders are dominant owners. This provides 
evidence to the importance of insider ownership during the early years of transition. Foreign 
owned companies comprise around 12% of the sample, while domestic outsider owned firms 
comprise around 18% of the sample. Finally, state owned firms comprise around 48% of the 
sample, with 232 firms being fully under state ownership while 30 firms being mostly in 
private hands but with the state still holding the dominant position11.  
 
The table also contains important information on ownership dynamics. It is apparent that the 
number of state and employee owned firms steadily decreases, while the number of domestic 
outsider and manager owned firms increases over time. While the decrease in the number of 
state owned firms over time is expected due to the continuation of the privatization process, 
the decrease in the number of employee owned firms seems to underline the suspicion that in 
the long-run this ownership structure is not viable and will be diluted in favor of others. Their 
inability to secure enough external funding and, consequently, to carry out the necessary 
investment in order to remain competitive is among the drivers of these dynamics. As for the 
increase in the number of manager owned firms, an argument often made is that it might be 
mostly caused by the concentration of ownership in the hands of managers in insider owned 
firms, i.e., by the shift of ownership rights from employees to managers. Evidence on these 
claims is provided by transition matrixes, which plot ownership structures at two different 
points in time against each other. An example is given in Table 2, where the ownership 
categories in 1995 are plotted against the ownership categories in 1999.  
                                                 
10 Examples of such inconsistencies are firms reporting zero labor force or capital or sales, or reporting 
ownership shares whose sum is lower or larger than 100. The following seven criteria were applied to the data: 
the firm’s capital at the beginning and the end of the period should be positive, investment should be non-
negative, investment should be smaller than end of period capital stock, sales should be positive, the average 
employment per year should be positive and equal to or greater than 10, labor cost in a given year should be 
positive and ownership shares should add up to 100. 
11 If the focus of the analysis had been simply the effect of private ownership versus state ownership these firms 
would have been classified as private ones. As the identity of private owners, however, matters in explaining 
differences in observed behavior, these firms end up being classified as state owned.  
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Overall, some important facts emerge from these transitions. First, state firms privatized after 
1995 end up mostly in the hands of outsider investors, i.e., domestic outsiders and foreigners, 
with employees and former employees being the least preferred option. Second, there is little 
employee or former employee activity in taking over firms once they are in private hands. 
Third, domestic outsiders, foreigners and managers are quite active in the market for 
corporate control, with continuous acquisitions and cessations across groups. Fourth, the 
concentration of ownership from employees to managers, although existing, is not the driving 
force behind the rise in managerial ownership. Finally, former employees hang on to their 
dominating ownership position for some time after they have left the firm, but ultimately 
renounce it. 
 
Turning to firm size distribution, Table 3 shows the distribution of firms by size groups over 
time, while Table 4 shows the joint distribution of firms by ownership and size groups. It is 
seen that over time large firms drop out of the sample. Because of the large number of state-
owned firms in this group, two potential reasons for the steady decrease in number of firms 
over time might be their break-up before privatization into smaller units or decreases in 
employment due to pre-privatization restructuring. Inspecting the joint distribution of 
ownership and size it is apparent that state owned firms tend mostly to be large, insider owned 
and, surprisingly, foreign owned firms tend to be small and medium, while domestic outsider 
owned firms tend to be small and large.  
 
Table 5 presents the summary statistics of the most relevant variables used in the analysis. 
The general facts that emerge from this table are that investment levels are high relative to 
capital stock, with investment/capital ratio ranging from 0.17 in 1993 to 0.34 in 1995, that 
average employment decreases while real wage increases over time, that cash flow is positive, 
that short-term debt increases over time and that cash flow and short-term debt are 
approximately of the same magnitude in all years but 1996. The increase in debt after 1995 is 
consistent with the general increase of lending to the private sector during this period in 
Estonia. Furthermore, up to 1997, the sum of cash flow and short-term debt is less than 
investment suggesting that firms might have had access to other sources of capital such as 
short-term trade credit and/or long-term debt. 
 
This conjecture is supported by the last two rows of the table that show current payables and 
long-term liabilities, which include long-term loans as well as any other long-term debt a firm 
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accumulates. The rate of growth of long-term liabilities is not high, except for the last year, 
suggesting that long-term liabilities do not constitute an important source of capital over the 
stated period. Current payables, however, are quite high and higher than investment over the 
whole period. Another important feature of Estonian firms during this period is that, on 
average, they have become more capital intensive as demonstrated by the increase in capital 
and decrease in employment.  
 
4. Results and Discussion 
 
In this section we report the results of estimating investment equations by ownership and size 
group. The results are obtained using Arellano’s and Bond's (1991) GMM estimator. 
Inference on coefficients is based on one-step procedure results, while on model specification 
on two-step procedure results. This is due to a downward bias in standard errors for small 
samples when the two-step procedure is applied. The standard errors of the underlying 
parameters of the model, i.e., the adjustment cost parameter, the optimal investment/capital 
ratio and the market power parameter, are then calculated using the delta method with 
analytical first derivatives.   
 
The effect of ownership structures on firm’s investment behavior and the degree of financial 
constraints is normally investigated by introducing ownership dummy variables and 
estimating the specifications using the pooled sample. Further, all dummies are interacted 
with all other real and financial variables in the regression allowing not only the intercepts but 
also slopes to differ across groups. A major problem in estimating such specifications with 
ownership variables as right-hand side variables is the endogeneity of ownership, i.e., in 
equilibrium different owners will determine their optimal ownership share based on various 
firm characteristics, among which is firm’s investment needs. A potential solution to the 
problem is the use of instrumental variables, i.e., the endogenous variables in the model, the 
ownership dummies in our case, are instrumented with a set of variables that are correlated 
with them but not with the error term.  
 
Yet, the instrumental variable approach is not without problems. Finding appropriate 
instruments for ownership dummies is difficult. The literature on the determinants of 
ownership structures identifies firm size, productivity, profitability, capital intensity, 
financing requirements and/or firm quality as determinants of ownership shares. All these 
variables could serve as instruments for the endogenous ownership dummies. The application 
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of the instrumental variable approach requires all instruments to be uncorrelated with the 
unobserved variables. In structural investment equations, however, all factors mentioned will 
be correlated with unobserved firm specific shocks to investment and, as such, still be 
correlated with the error terms. Then, the use of bad instruments will still lead to biased 
parameter estimates (Angrist and Krueger, 2001).   
  
An alternative approach is the division of the sample into several sub-samples according to 
the ownership groups defined and the estimation of the relevant specifications for every sub-
sample separately. Other than avoiding the pitfalls of instrumental variable approach, this 
approach offers the possibility to test the hypothesis on the existence of different objective 
functions across groups of firms. This is the approach adopted here by dividing the sample 
into five sub-samples as follows: state owned, domestic outsider owned, foreign owned, 
manager owned and employee owned firms12. In the interpretation of results we then focus on 
the differences in respective coefficients across ownership groups, which provide unbiased 
estimates of the true differences. The results of the estimating the equations under alternative 
assumptions on firm’s objective function are reported in Tables 6 and 7. 
 
Focusing first on model performance we see that the over-identifying restrictions, tested 
through Sargan’s test, are accepted at high probability levels, while the second order 
autocorrelation test is always rejected. Also, adjusted R-squared are comparable across 
equations and range from around 18% to around 22%. Finally, model adequacy is also 
confirmed by the rejection of the null that all coefficients are jointly zero. 
 
Turning to estimates of structural parameters we see that the adjustment cost parameter and 
the optimal investment/capital ratio are generally positive and significant across all equations, 
while the market power parameter is significant only in the case of domestic outsider owned 
and foreign owned firms. The estimates of adjustment cost parameters imply different relative 
size of adjustment costs to investment expenditures across ownership groups. Assuming that 
parameter  is zero and evaluating the size of adjustment costs at the mean investment capital 
ratio for each group, we find that adjustment costs for foreign owned firms vary between 16% 
and 19% of investment expenditures, for domestic outsider owned firms between 20% and 
22%, for manager owned firms between 29% and 36%, for employee owned firms between 
b
                                                 
12 As the number of observations for former employee owned firms does not allow independent analysis of this 
group, these firms are included in the employee owned firms group. 
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30% and 36% and for state owned firms between 27% and 34%. When optimal 
investment/capital ratios are compared with their sample means across ownership groups we 
find that state owned firms have the lowest deviation of actual versus optimal investment rate, 
while manager and employee owned firms have the highest. This suggest that, even 
accounting for the non zero value of  in calculating adjustment costs, manager and 
employee owned firms will face large adjustment costs relative to investment expenditures. 
Finally, the estimates of market power parameter are insignificant for state owned, manager 
owned and employee owned firms. Exception is the estimate of this parameter in Model 1 for 
manager owned firms, which is positive and significant. The value of 0.93, however, is close 
to unity, implying no market power. In contrast, the values of this parameter for domestic 
outsider and foreign owned firms are positive, significant and well above unity, indicating 
that these firms operate in the elastic portion of their demand curve and enjoy monopoly 
power. The values of the parameter are larger for foreign owned firms than for domestic 
outsider owned firms across all specifications.  
b
 
Important differences in investment behavior across ownership groups emerge while 
inspecting the estimates of financial variables’ coefficients. Comparing the coefficients across 
groups several things are worth noting. First, as expected, different types of firms display 
different sensitivity to measures of financial constraints. As seen in Table 7.3, estimates of all 
coefficients of financial variables for foreign owned firms are insignificant, indicating that 
these firms are not constrained in any sense in their investment behavior. Given that foreign 
owned firms in Estonia might be either subsidiaries or joint ventures with foreign partners, it 
is highly possible that profits earned in other countries could be invested in Estonia and the 
other way round. As such, the measures of internal funds and debt as defined here will not be 
the relevant ones for these firms. Instead, measures of global funds across different markets 
where these firms operate will be needed to describe their behavior. Unfortunately, we 
possess data neither on the relations of these firms with their parent companies, if any, nor on 
their access to international capital markets.  
 
Other types of firms, albeit to differing degrees, display sensitivity to the availability of 
internal and/or external finance. Manager owned firms are the only ones among them not 
displaying significant sensitivity to the availability of internal funds, while state owned, 
domestic outside owned and employee owned firms all display positive and significant 
sensitivity to measures of internal funds, implying different degrees of financing constraints. 
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Among the latter three groups, the sensitivity is highest for employee owned firms and then 
for state owned ones. For instance, the estimate of internal funds parameter for Model 1 for 
employee owned firms is 0.052. This estimate is 30% larger than the one for state owned 
firms and almost twice as large as the one for domestic outsider owned ones. The differences 
in estimates vary from model to model, but the pattern remains the same. The estimate of 
internal funds squared parameter, included to capture potential non-linearities, is significant 
only for employee owned firms13, indicating that for these firms availability of internal 
finance is crucial in investment policies.   
 
One argument against the interpretation of coefficients of cash flow and value added as 
indicators of financing constraints is that they also proxy for future investment opportunities. 
However, if measures of cash flow or value added are equally correlated with future 
opportunities across all firm types, then the differences in these coefficients are unbiased 
indicators of differences in financing constraints. This is tested by estimating an equation with 
sales as dependent variable and different lags of cash flow, ownership dummies and their 
interaction with lagged cash flow variables as independent ones. The results, not reported 
here, showed that cash flow predicts future sales across all firms and that the effect is larger 
for foreign and domestic outsider owned firms than for the other types. This finding supports 
our conjecture that differences in internal funds parameter between, for example, employee 
owned or state owned firms and foreign owned firms are a good predictor of financing 
constraints.    
 
Further evidence of financial constraints comes from the inspection of coefficients of external 
finance variables. In this case, state owned firms display no sensitivity to availability of 
external finance, as shown by the insignificant coefficients of debt and its squared parameters. 
This could serve as indicator that state owned firms are not as constrained as might be 
conjectured in raising external finance, i.e. they might be operating under soft budget 
constraints regime. Alternatively, it could be conjectured that, due to high price they might 
have to pay for external finance, they rely mostly on internal funds to finance their 
investment, as expressed by the positive and significant coefficient of internal funds 
parameters, and, as such, have not yet hit their credit limit. Finally, the significant coefficient 
of internal finance and the insignificant coefficient of external finance could also be 
                                                 
13 With one exception in Model 3 for state owned firms where the coefficient is significant at 10% significance 
level. 
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interpreted as evidence of managerial discretion and their preferences against outside control. 
In contrast, all other domestic owned firms, that is domestic outsider owned, manager owned 
and employee owned, seem to have hit their debt limit in that, whenever significant, higher 
levels of debt are associated with lower investment rates. The sensitivities are highest, in 
absolute value, for employee owned firms and then for domestic outsider owned firms across 
all specifications. Interestingly, the case of manager owned firms is the opposite of that of 
state owned firms, in that they show significant sensitivity to the availability of external 
finance but insignificant sensitivity to the availability of internal funds.  
 
A general fact emerging from inspecting the tables is that financial constraints operate both 
through debt and availability of internal funds, although the coefficients of internal funds are 
significant more often than those of external finance. A final observation is that, results are 
robust to the alternative definitions of internal funds, i.e., the use of cash flow or value added, 
as well as to the assumption on firm’s objective function. This means that, while their 
magnitude and significance changes across different specifications, their sign remains the 
same. 
 
The last step of the analysis in this sub-section is testing whether firms under different 
ownership structures have different objective functions. As in the previous sub-section, given 
the non-nested nature of the competing models, the tests are carried out using Davidson and 
MacKinnon’s (1981) J-test for non-nested alternatives. The results of the test are reported in 
Table 8.  The table should be read as follows. The cells in column “Model 1” show the t-test 
on the significance of the fitted values from Model 3 that are added as an additional regressor 
in Model 1, while the cells in column “Model 3” show the t-test on the significance of the 
fitted values from Model 1 that are added as an additional regressor in Model 3. The 
interpretation is similar for Model 2 and Model 4. The test results show that for state and 
manager owned firms we are able to reject both models as being the correct ones. However, 
under alternative definitions of internal funds, we conclude that foreign and domestic outsider 
owned firms behave consistently with profit (dividends) maximization hypothesis, while 
employee owned firms behave consistently with dividends per worker maximization 
hypothesis. These conclusions provide support against treating all the firms as being similar 
and pooling them in one sample.  
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In chapter two, we argued that the probability of firms facing liquidity constraints is not 
independent from firm size. The reasons for this are that both the cost to outsiders of 
collecting information and the cost to insiders of issuing debt and/or equity decrease with firm 
size. Consequently, small firms are expected to face more severe liquidity constraints than 
large firms. In testing the proposition on the role of firm's size on liquidity constraints, the 
same approach as in the case of ownership structure is followed. That is, the sample is divided 
into three sub-samples of small, medium and large firms14, and the analysis is performed 
separately for every sub-sample. The estimation results are reported in Table 6.5.1 through 
Table 6.5.3. Model performance is in line with the previous results. Sargan's statistic in all the 
models is accepted at high probability levels, the second order autocorrelation hypothesis is 
always rejected at high significance levels and the adjusted R-squared are at the range of 16% 
to 22%. Furthermore, the estimates of adjustment cost and optimal investment/capital ratio 
parameters are positive and significant for all the three size groups, while the market power 
parameter is positive and significant only for small and large firms but insignificant for 
medium firms. 
 
With respect to estimates of financial variables parameters, it is seen that they are significant 
and of the expected sign only for medium sized firms. Given the non-significance of 
parameters for the other two groups it is impossible to make comparisons across groups. 
These results are at odds with the results obtained, for instance, by Fazzari, Hubbard and 
Petersen (1988), who find that the likelihood of firms experiencing liquidity constraints 
decreases with firms size, and Hooks (2003), but are in line with the results of Audretsch and 
Elston (2002) who find that small German firms face fewer liquidity constraints. However, 
while Audretsch’s and Elston’s (2002) results are driven by the specific institutional structure 
in Germany, which provides long-term and competitively priced capital to small enterprises, 
in our sample, results are driven by the specific ownership distribution within each size group. 
More specifically, as shown in chapter four, the group of small firms is characterized by the 
large share of foreign owned and manager owned firms, which, as reported in the previous 
sub-section, show little sensitivity to financial variables. The significant results for medium 
firms could be driven by the large share of domestic outsider owned and state owned firms 
within this group. 
                                                 
14 Firms are divided into three size groups according to their average employment in a given year. The first 
group includes firms with 49 or fewer employees, the second includes firms with more than 49 employees and 
fewer than 101, and the third group includes firms with more than 101 employees. 
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5. Conclusions and Policy Implications 
 
Strategic restructuring is identified as one of the pillars on which rests the success of 
transition. It, in turn, depends, to a large extent, on firms’ ability to carry out the necessary 
investment by raising large amounts of capital operating under hard budget constraints. 
Furthermore, a good investment climate is a precondition for achieving sustainable long-term 
economic growth and poverty reduction. In this paper we have investigated whether 
investment spending of firms in Estonia is affected by liquidity constraints as well as whether 
the degree of such constraints differs across firms under different governance structures. The 
analysis is carried out by explicitly modeling firms’ investment behavior in a dynamic setting 
in the presence of quadratic adjustment costs, and debt and equity constraints. A major 
advantage of this Euler equation approach is that it allows the estimation of the effects of 
financial constraints on inter-temporal allocation of investment, which avoids the 
measurement issues involved when an explicit investment demand equation has to be 
assumed. After deriving the optimal rule for capital accumulation from firm’s dynamic 
optimization problem, the up to date econometric modeling of liquidity constraints is based on 
ad hoc inclusion in the specification of variables affecting access to capital, due to the fact 
that these variables do not explicitly enter first order conditions of firm’s maximization 
problem. In this paper, however, we follow the approach of Chatelain (1998, 2000) that 
allows for an explicit solution of the Lagrangean multiplier related to dividend constraint in 
terms of financial variables. Differently from the ad hoc approach, this approach leads to the 
inclusion of financial variables in respective investment equations in first differences rather 
than in levels.  
 
While we argue that the identity of owners matters in the severity of liquidity constraints that 
firms face, current and future financing needs are also important determinants of the choice of 
optimal ownership structures. This two-way causality leads to endogeneity of ownership 
structures with respect to investment rates, which, if not accounted for, would result in biased 
estimates. Two potential ways to correct for it are the use of instrumental variables and the 
use of the predicted values from an equation modeling determinants of ownership structures. 
Both of them, however, are problematic. On the one hand, the use of instrumental variables is 
complicated by their potential correlation with firm specific shocks to investment, leading to 
biases of an unknown nature. On the other hand, the use of predicted values from a first-step 
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regression of ownership shares or dummies on various factors that influence the choice of 
ownership structures requires that regression specification be exactly right for the second step 
estimates to be consistent. These considerations lead us to adopt the following estimation 
strategy: divide the sample into sub-samples of firms belonging to a given ownership class, 
estimate investment equations separately for each group and focus on the differences in 
estimated coefficients across groups.  
  
The empirical results underline several important points. First of all, the adjustment cost 
parameter and the optimal investment/capital ratio with minimal adjustment costs are positive 
and significant across all groups and across all specifications. Second, only for foreign and 
domestic outsider owned firms the market power parameter is significant and well above 
unity, indicating that these firms enjoy some monopoly power. Third, financial variables, used 
as proxy for the degree of liquidity constraints, play a significant role in firm's investment 
decisions. Although all coefficients of internal and external funds are insignificant when the 
Euler equations are estimated for the whole sample, the inclusion of financial variables 
improved the performance of estimated equations in terms of not being able to reject the 
hypothesis that they are correctly specified.  
 
Fourth, the degree of liquidity constraints varies with firm ownership structure. We 
consistently find that, on average, all non-foreign owned firms face some liquidity constraints 
either through positive and significant coefficients of internal funds variables or through 
negative and significant coefficients of external funds variables. The behavior of foreign 
owned firms, however, is consistent with the Euler equation specification in the absence of 
liquidity constraints. These findings provide support to the hierarchy of finance arguments 
and are consistent with the belief that successful restructuring in a transition economy is 
dependent on the availability of finance. Focusing on coefficient differences across groups, 
we find that the sensitivity of investment to the availability of internal and external finance is 
stronger for employee owned firms. From the other groups, somewhat surprisingly, only 
domestic outsider owned firms display sensitivity to both measures of the availability of 
finance, with manager owned firms being sensitive to the availability of external finance, 
while state owned firms being sensitive to the availability of internal finance. The results on 
domestic outsider owned firms imply that these firms could suffer from high levels of 
managerial discretion and control. All in all, the results provide support to almost all 
hypotheses outlined in Section 2. Only in the case of manager owned firms we do not find 
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support to the hypothesis of positive and significant correlation between investment rates and 
measures of internal funds. Furthermore, we find evidence that, on average, employee owned 
firms are more financially constrained than the other types.   
 
Finally, we provide evidence that firm behavior in a transition economy cannot be analyzed 
by invoking the representative firm approach. The results of Davidson’s and MacKinnon’s 
(1981) J-tests for non-nested alternatives reject the hypothesis that employee owned firms can 
be modeled as profit maximizers. Curiously, the tests do not reach a clear conclusion with 
respect to state owned and manager owned firms, implying that their behavior is consistent 
with both profit maximization and profit per worker maximization. The results imply that, due 
to firm heterogeneity, pooling all firms in one sample for the purpose of the analysis would 
result in mis-specification bias.  
 
The paper contributes to the literature in several important aspects. First, it provides more 
evidence in support of the financing hierarchy hypothesis15. Second, it adds to the stock of the 
limited evidence on the role of liquidity constraints on firm behavior in a transition economy. 
Third, it is among the few studies, such as the ones by Lizal (1998) and Lizal and Svejnar 
(2002), which make a comprehensive analysis of the effect of various ownership structures on 
firm investment behavior. Especially, advantage of this paper compared to the others is the 
possibility of identification of insider owners, both managers and employees, which allows us 
to test various propositions related to their behavior. In most of other studies, due to data 
unavailability, authors use state versus private owned or state, private and foreign owned 
division. A study that investigates similar issues for Estonian firms using company accounts 
data is Masso (2002). The author, however, focuses only on the differences between foreign 
and Estonian domestic firms. As such, this study offers a better picture of processes that 
characterize Estonian transition.  
 
The robustness of results, however, needs to be further tested by employing both larger 
samples and better measures of access to capital. As already mentioned, in short time panels 
the GMM estimates suffer from semi-consistency. As transition proceeds and data become 
more and more available, it will be possible to make use of longer time panels that will lead to 
better estimates. In addition to estimation strategy, it is often argued that the use of financial 
                                                 
15 Studies listed in footnote 1 have found evidence consistent with this hypothesis.  
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variables to proxy for liquidity constraints is not perfect in that they also convey information 
on future profitability. In our case both profit and revenue from sale of non-current assets 
might fall into this category. If, for instance, the latter variable is correlated with the lack of 
future growth opportunities, then it would not be a perfect measure of liquidity constraints. In 
separating these effects data on the type of assets sold would be needed. If assets sold are not 
related to firm’s core operations, then it is likely this action represents restructuring rather 
than lack of growth opportunities. The reverse might be true if assets sold belong to firm’s 
core operations. Furthermore, given the arguments on the separation of ownership and 
control, measures of control and the degree of monitoring need to be employed in order to be 
able to account for the effect of unobservables, such as for example managerial discretion, on 
investment behavior.    
 
A continuous and lively debate in the transition literature is the efficiency and viability of 
various ownership structures. The arguments in the debate could be well summarized in 
Hansmann’s (1996) survivorship test, which says that if a given organizational form does not 
survive, then it must have been at a comparative disadvantage compared to other forms. One 
of the organizational structures that, on various theoretical grounds, has been pinpointed as 
inefficient, and, as such, subject to extinction, is employee owned firms. The theoretical 
arguments have given rise to empirical work that tries to assess the inefficiency of employee 
owned firms. Estonia is one of the countries where employee ownership has been in decline, 
as indicated also by our data presented in Table 2. Kalmi (2002) makes a thorough analysis of 
the degeneration of these firms and finds that structural bias towards extinction16 and 
insufficient motives of incumbent insiders to extend ownership to new employees are the 
main reasons that drive their decline. Our results emphasize here the degree of liquidity 
constraints as a further factor that potentially accentuates the decline of employee ownership. 
Indeed, Kalmi’s (2002) and ours sets of conclusions are complementary and provide the 
strongest evidence yet on the causes of employee ownership degeneration. In addition, a 
major contribution of this paper is that it is probably the first to provide robust evidence to the 
arguments that employee owned firms do face larger liquidity constraints than other types of 
firms. While this result is relevant for Estonia and other transition countries with high 
incidence of employee ownership, the overall evidence on the impact of alternative ownership 
structures on firm’s policies is also pertinent to the broader corporate governance literature, 
                                                 
16 This bias is caused by the property rights designation within the firm and the imperfection of the market for 
shares. 
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which attempts, among other things, to ascertain the costs and benefits of governance through 
ownership. 
 
These results imply a role for public policy in increasing the level of investment by 
influencing the environment firms operate in through policy measures such as the provision of 
fiscal incentives, development of capital markets and financial system and improvements of 
access to capital. Fiscal incentives in the form of lower corporate taxes and/or exemption of 
retained earnings used for investment from taxes, i.e. taxes will be paid only on the level of 
profits above that of investments, will stimulate investment through an increase in availability 
of internal funds. Indeed, since 2000 retained earnings are exempt from taxation in Estonia. 
While it is still early to assess the full effects of such policy, it is expected that, in the long run 
it will result in higher capital stock. For instance, Masso (2002), citing unpublished work 
done using a model based on Tobin’s Q, states that the long run effect of this policy is 
expected to bring about an increase in capital stock of 6.1%. There is a possibility, however, 
that such policies might produce undesirable effects. Under the conditions when managers 
enjoy high degrees of discretion, an increase in the availability of internal finance simply 
offers them more resources at their disposal to pursue their own interests at the expense of 
those of the other shareholders. Instead of relaxing the constraints, the outcome of this policy 
might then be over investment. These potential costs, as well as the fact that the provision of 
fiscal incentives depends on government’s budget constraints, imply a limited role for fiscal 
policies. As such, they must be combined with other policies designed not only to relax 
liquidity constraints but also to mitigate agency conflicts within the firm by curbing 
managerial discretion.       
 
One way to achieve both objectives is to follow policies to further develop capital markets 
and the financial sector, i.e., banking and non-banking institutions. Estonia’s capital market, 
although growing, is small, and, as such, its future will lie in alliances with other stock 
exchanges. The first step in this direction is the creation of the pan-Baltic stock exchange in 
early 2000. Subsequent membership of Estonia in the European Union in 2004 will also open 
European capital markets to Estonian companies. However, those likely to benefit from the 
stock market, at least in the short term, are large firms. More important for Estonian firms in 
general is the development of the banking sector and other non-banking institutions, such as 
investment funds, venture capital funds, mutual funds and credit unions. The banking system 
in Estonia is consolidated and well regulated. Nevertheless, it is mostly involved in financing 
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the government than the private sector. Here there is scope to introduce legislation that will 
increase banks incentives to extend loans to private companies. Similar steps need to be taken 
to increase non-banking institutions participation in financing the private sector, which until 
now has been marginal. A possible way would be to provide tax breaks to such institutions 
that would be contingent to the amount of loans they extend to private companies, especially 
to those encountering difficulties in raising finance. 
 
An alternative way for governments to relax liquidity constraints for certain types of firms is 
to provide direct subsidies to them. This policy, however, is likely not to be efficient on two 
grounds. First, to the extent that, governments are not more efficient than private sector in 
identifying firms with binding versus non-binding constraints, it could exacerbate the lemons 
problems. Second, it could soften recipient’s budget constraints and lead to inefficient capital 
allocation. Indeed, the available evidence points to no effect of government subsidies on 
firms’ growth. For instance, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1996) find that government 
subsidies to industry do not increase the proportion of firms growing faster than predicted. 
Finally, a faster way of injecting capital into firms is to promote the inflow of foreign direct 
investment either in the form of fully foreign owned subsidiaries, established through 
greenfield investment or acquisition of an Estonian state or private owned company, or 
partnerships with domestic capital. The latter is of particular interests for Estonian private 
companies in need of fresh funds for investment. Given that foreign owners have access to 
global capital markets, this will enable Estonian companies to gain access to sources of funds 
that will have otherwise been either inaccessible or too costly.  
 
The measures outlined above are not likely to improve the situation unless applied in 
combination with each other. The actual set of policy measures to be applied at a particular 
moment in time will depend on general macroeconomic conditions and the stage of 
institutional development. Successive Estonian governments have been very active in 
designing policies to improve firms’ access to capital. Results of this paper suggest, however, 
that there is still latitude for public policy action.
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Table 1. Ownership Distribution Over Time  
Year 
 
Ownership Group 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Total 
Domestic Outsiders 81 94 97 110 95 90 119 686
Employee 48 54 47 41 27 26 29 272
Former Employees 0 0 11 14 19 15 16 75
Foreign 42 60 63 68 67 59 72  431
Managers 45 53 65 76 81 71 84 475
State 228 181 262 204 172 123 6  1,176
No Answer 54 56 1 19 18 31 179
Total 498 498 545 514 480 402 357  3294
 
Table 2. Transition Matrix for Ownership Changes Between 1995 and 1999  
Ownership Group 
1999 
 
Ownership Group 
1995 
Domestic 
Outsider 
Employee Former 
Employee 
Foreign Manager State Total 
Domestic Outsider 30 8 6 21 28 1 94
Employee 15 4 4 10 10 1 44
Former Employee 4 0 0 2 3 1 10
Foreign 18 6 0 17 15 1 57
Manager 20 5 3 14 17 2 61
State 32 6 3 9 11  0 61
Total 119 29 16 73 84 6 327
 
Table 3. Number of Firms by Size Over Time
Year 
 
Firm Size 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Total 
Small Firms (1-49)  219 225 218 214 203 169 154 1402
Medium Firms (50-100) 78 104 126 123 118 98 94 741 
Large Firms (> 100) 201 169 201 177 159 135 109 1151
Total 498 498 545 514 480 402 357 3294
1 Firm size groups are defined in terms of the number of employees. 
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Table 4. Number of Firms by Ownership Group and Size                
Firm Size 
 
Ownership Form 
Small Firms Medium Firms Large Firms Total 
Domestic Outsiders 254 141 291 686
Employee 132 55 85 272 
Former Employee 41 16 18 75 
Foreign 209 109 113 431 
Managers 276 128 71 475 
State 400 252 524 1176 
No Answer  90 40 49 179
Total 1402 741 1151 3294 
 
 
 
Table 5. Means and Standard Deviations of Principal Variables Over Time 
Year 
 
Variables1
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Obs.2
Investment 2150 
(12363) 
2245 
(18844) 
3371 
(22029) 
3007 
(17249) 
2634 
(15504) 
3407 
(14019) 
4547 
(19549) 
3283 
Capital 12250 
(51023) 
9740 
(48137) 
9771 
(45305) 
10329 
(47218) 
10411 
(47756) 
11200 
(49623) 
16816 
(43022) 
3294 
Sales 21773 
(63301) 
21502 
(61562) 
30377 
(93119) 
24269 
(69179) 
27573 
(77562) 
27989 
(63535) 
32816 
(88789) 
3294 
Employment3 196 
(414) 
166 
(340) 
164 
(388) 
161 
(393) 
157 
(276) 
137 
(282) 
124 
(228) 
3294 
Real Wage4 14.42 
(17.11) 
16.46 
(10.91) 
13.31 
(7.73) 
21.04 
(30.59) 
21.92 
(17.28) 
22.96 
(14.63) 
28.37 
(18.33) 
3294 
Cash Flow 805 
(7530) 
649 
(8801) 
1103 
(10008) 
658 
(12607) 
1678 
(14428) 
1994 
(18195) 
2932 
(17328) 
3294 
Debt 867 
(2692) 
891 
(4112) 
1389 
(3974) 
1701 
(4007) 
1717 
(3664) 
2276 
(3885) 
2962 
(4127) 
3294 
Current 
Payables 
5516 
(23301) 
4848 
(21130) 
3804 
(11895) 
4334 
(12503) 
4363 
(10672) 
4605 
(12843) 
5445 
(15750) 
3294 
Long-Term 
Liabilities  
2595 
(14961) 
2702 
(19652) 
3143 
(12450) 
3433 
(12048) 
3820 
(13874) 
4469 
(12052) 
6863 
(16384) 
3294 
1All the variables except employment are expressed in thousands of Estonian kroons and in 1993 
prices 
2This number is the sum over the whole sample with non-missing values for the respective variable 
3Average number of employees in a given year 
4Real average wage per employee 
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Table 6. GMM Estimates of Investment Functions by Ownership Group for Dividend 
Maximization Modela
   Ownership Group 
 
Parameters 
State 
Owned 
Employee 
Owned 
Manager 
Owned 
Foreign 
Owned 
Domestic 
Outsider 
Owned
Adjustment Cost 
Parameter,  a
2.739*** 
(4.22) 
3.017*** 
(2.56) 
2.313** 
(1.22) 
1.385*** 
(4.73) 
1.923** 
(1.67) 
Optimal 
Investment- 
Capital Ratio,  b
   0.21** 
(2.02) 
0.11** 
(2.09) 
0.12** 
(1.11) 
0.17** 
(2.27) 
0.19*** 
(7.27) 
Market Power 
Parameter, η  
0.87 
(0.94) 
0.82 
(0.78) 
0.93* 
(1.62) 
1.38** 
(1.78) 
1.25*** 
(3.79) 
Internal Funds 
Parameter 
0.04*** 
(3.23) 
0.052*** 
(3.68) 
0.018 
(0.74) 
0.004 
(0.28) 
0.027** 
(1.32) 
Internal Funds 
Squared 
Parameter 
0.0012 
(0.98) 
0.002* 
(1.64) 
0.003 
(0.97) 
0.0001 
(1.01) 
0.0001 
(0.18) 
External Funds 
Parameter 
- 0.004 
(- 0.68)  
    - 0.051** 
    (- 1.78)  
    - 0.021* 
    (- 3.26)  
   - 0.00001 
     (- 0.37)  
  - 0.022*** 
    (- 3.00)  
External Funds 
Squared 
Parameter 
0.0002 
(0.86) 
   - 0.012** 
   (- 1.84) 
  - 0.009*** 
   (- 3.85) 
0.0004 
(1.15) 
- 0.002 
(- 1.16) 
F-test 
5% Critical Value 
12.34 
1.75 
9.45 
1.75 
9.64 
1.75 
15.76 
1.75 
12.65 
1.75 
Sargan's Statistic 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
21.76 
14 
0.12 
21.07 
14 
0.11
14.08 
14 
0.42
20.96 
14 
0.12 
20.57 
14 
0.13
Second Order 
Autocorrelation 
Test 
0.46 
0.64 
-1.03 
0.27 
-1.04 
0.29 
-0.86 
0.37 
0.45 
0.64 
No. of Observations 303 212 277 254 241 
Adjusted R-
Squared 0.191 0.205 0.209 0.218 0.186 
a Values in brackets denote respective t-statistics. Each model is estimated with time dummies, whose estimates 
are not reported here. Internal funds are measured by the sum of cash flow, short-term assets and revenue from 
sale of non-current assets, while external funds are measured by the amount of outstanding debt. The t-statistics 
of adjustment cost, optimal investment/capital ratio and market power parameters are calculated using delta 
method with analytical first derivatives. Instrument sets include all real and financial variables lagged three 
periods or more. All regressions include the inverse of Mill’s Ratio to account for sample selection bias. 
***   Denotes significance at 1% significance level. 
* *    Denotes significance at 5% significance level. 
* *    Denotes significance at 10% significance level. 
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Table 7. GMM Estimates of Investment Functions by Ownership Group for Dividend 
per Worker Maximization Modela
   Ownership Group 
 
Parameters 
State 
Owned 
Employee 
Owned 
Manager 
Owned 
Foreign 
Owned 
Domestic 
Outsider 
Owned
Adjustment Cost 
Parameter,  a
2.137* 
(1.55) 
 2.524** 
(1.76) 
 1.932*** 
(3.09) 
 1.285*** 
(3.62) 
 1.784** 
(1.71) 
Optimal 
Investment- 
Capital Ratio,  b
0.24*** 
(4.18) 
0.18*** 
(5.38) 
0.25** 
(1.92) 
0.33*** 
(4.47) 
0.31** 
(2.29) 
Market Power 
Parameter, η  
1.03 
(0.79) 
0.94 
(1.21) 
1.02 
(0.76) 
1.35** 
(2.29) 
1.31*** 
(3.71) 
Internal Funds 
Parameter 
0.02*** 
(4.47) 
0.025*** 
(3.75) 
0.0001 
(1.12) 
0.0002 
(0.75) 
0.018* 
(3.73) 
Internal Funds 
Squared 
Parameter 
 0.0009* 
(1.32) 
 0.0015** 
(2.24) 
 0.0001 
(1.12) 
 0.0002 
(0.97) 
 0.00008 
(0.29) 
External Funds 
Parameter 
- 0.001 
(- 1.00) 
- 0.0047** 
(- 1.57) 
- 0.0037 
(- 0.27) 
0.00002 
(1.09) 
0.00013 
(0.18) 
External Funds 
Squared 
Parameter 
     0.0004 
(0.75) 
  - 0.0015** 
     (- 1.92) 
    - 0.0003 
(- 0.37) 
     - 0.0001 
(- 0.98) 
     - 0.0005 
(- 0.12) 
F-test 
5% Critical Value 
27.57 
1.67 
15.25 
1.67 
13.54 
1.67 
29.32 
1.67 
21.28 
1.67 
Sargan's Statistic 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
17.46 
14 
0.20 
9.24 
14 
0.79
8.75 
14 
0.84
17.45 
14 
0.19 
21.34 
14 
0.10
Second Order 
Autocorrelation 
Test 
        - 1.06 
0.29 
        - 1.07 
0.28 
        - 1.07 
0.28 
       - 0.43 
0.66 
- 0.79 
0.44 
No. of Observations 303 212 276 254 240 
Adjusted R-
Squared 0.201 0.209 0.216 0.222 0.198 
a Values in brackets denote respective t-statistics. Each model is estimated with time dummies, whose estimates 
are not reported here. Internal funds are measured by the sum of cash flow, short-term assets and revenue from 
sale of non-current assets, while external funds are measured by the amount of outstanding debt. The t-statistics 
of adjustment cost, optimal investment/capital ratio and market power parameters are calculated using delta 
method with analytical first derivatives. Instrument sets include all real and financial variables lagged three 
periods or more. All regressions include the inverse of Mill’s Ratio to account for sample selection bias. 
***   Denotes significance at 1% significance level. 
* *    Denotes significance at 5% significance level. 
* *    Denotes significance at 10% significance level. 
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Table 8. Results of Testing the Existence of Different Objective Functions Across 
Ownership Groups Using the Davidson and MacKinnon J-Test for Non-Nested Modelsa
Model 
 
Ownership 
Group 
With Cash Flow as Measures of 
Internal Funds 
With Value Added as Measures of 
Internal Funds 
 Dividend Model Dividend per 
Worker Model 
Dividend Model Dividend per 
Worker Model 
State t = 7.78*** (0.000) 
t = 12.34*** 
(0.000) 
t = 6.29*** 
(0.000) 
t = 13.19*** 
(0.000) 
Foreign t = 0.52 (0.602) 
t = 9.25*** 
(0.000) 
t = 0.53 
(0.593) 
t = 12.97*** 
(0.000) 
Domestic t = 1.23 (0.198) 
t = 6.97*** 
(0.000) 
t = 1.28* 
(0.100) 
t = 8.21*** 
(0.000) 
Manager t = 6.48*** (0.000) 
t = 5.12 
(0.000) 
t = 7.12*** 
(0.000) 
t = 9.54*** 
(0.000) 
Employee t = 14.36*** (0.000) 
t = 0.64 
(0.486) 
t = 11.72*** 
(0.000) 
t = 0.24 
(0.808) 
a The table reports the results of testing whether firm behavior across ownership groups is better characterized by 
maximization of the discounted present value of total dividends or by maximization of the discounted present 
value of dividends per worker. The t-statistic corresponds to the fitted values of the alternative model added as 
an additional variable in the basic model, which is the one identified in the respective column. Numbers in 
brackets are the respective p-values. A significant coefficient of the fitted values leads to the rejection of the 
respective basic model in favor of the alternative one.   
***   Denotes significance at 1% significance level. 
* *    Denotes significance at 5% significance level. 
*       Denotes significance at 10% significance level. 
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Table 8. GMM Estimates of Investment Functions by Size Groupa
              Size Group 
 
Parameters 
Small Firms Medium Firms Large Firms 
Adjustment Cost 
Parameter,  a
2.365** 
(2.09) 
2.612* 
(3.97) 
2.593*** 
(1.35) 
Optimal Investment- 
Capital Ratio,  b
0.21* 
(4.08) 
0.14** 
(1.57) 
0.15* 
(5.23) 
Market Power 
Parameter, η  
1.09** 
(2.14) 
0.95 
(1.05) 
1.39*** 
(1.61) 
Internal Funds 
Parameter 
0.027 
(0.79) 
0.043* 
(3.26) 
0.036 
(0.94) 
Internal Funds Squared 
Parameter 
0.001 
(0.87) 
0.0006 
(0.87) 
0.00007 
(0.74) 
External Funds 
Parameter 
- 0.012 
 (- 0.68)  
     - 0.059* 
 (- 2.78)  
-  0.037 
 (- 0.38)  
External Funds Squared 
Parameter 
- 0.003 
(- 0.52) 
- 0.009* 
(- 2.97) 
- 0.006 
(- 0.74) 
F-test 
5% Critical Value 
12.37 
1.75 
9.46 
1.75 
15.90 
1.75 
Sargan's Statistic 
Degrees of Freedom 
P-value 
18.49 
14 
0.19
16.45 
14 
0.23
19.19 
14 
0.14 
Second Order 
Autocorrelation Test 
P-value 
-1.12 
0.26 
-0.96 
0.34 
-1.29 
0.20 
No. of Observations 507 312 468 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.221 0.197 0.192 
a Values in brackets denote respective t-statistics. Each model is estimated with time dummies, whose estimates 
are not reported here. Internal funds are measured by the sum of cash flow, short-term assets and revenue from 
sale of non-current assets, while external funds are measured by the amount of outstanding debt. The t-statistics 
of adjustment cost, optimal investment/capital ratio and market power parameters are calculated using delta 
method with analytical first derivatives. Instrument sets include all real and financial variables lagged three 
periods or more. All regressions include the inverse of Mill’s Ratio to account for sample selection bias. 
***   Denotes significance at 1% significance level. 
* *    Denotes significance at 5% significance level. 
* *    Denotes significance at 10% significance level. 
 
 26
A P P E N D I X 
 
In constructing ownership groups and categories the precise meaning of ownership needs to be defined. In the 
literature, ownership is considered to be the right to residual returns, i.e., to what remains after the factors of 
production have been paid their contribution. In addition, some argue that control rights should also be included 
in the definition of ownership (Hansmann, 1996). This brings up the issue whether formal or real control needs 
to be taken into account. Measuring control and, especially, distinguishing formal versus real control, in the data 
used in this paper, is not possible. Establishing this relationship, or the lack of it, would require data, for 
instance, on owners’ board representation, on voting rules, shares classes and voting behavior of different groups 
of owners, which are not available. Bearing this in mind, for the purposes of this analysis ownership is defined in 
terms of the percentage of shares held by each group of owners.  
 
Based on the respective direct shareholdings, six broad groups of owners are defined as follows: state, foreign, 
domestic outsiders, former employees, incumbent employees and managers. A common pitfall in defining 
ownership stakes for all these groups is that no correction is made for potential cross holding of shares, as the 
identity of the enterprises that hold shares to each other is not known. This problem could result in understating 
the real share held by some owner types and overstating the share held by other owner types. For example, due 
to specifics of privatization legislation17 foreigners invest in an enterprise through another domestic holding 
registered in Estonia. This practice assigns the shares held by the domestic holding as being held by domestic 
outsiders. This issue might also arise in the case of insider ownership when insiders, in order to acquire an 
enterprise, establish first another company that officially takes over the enterprise to be privatized18.  
 
Another definitional problem has to do with the distinction of employees and managers as well as with the 
percentage of employees being owners. The distinction between employees and managers depends on the 
individual enterprise’s classification of middle level managers. There might be cases when the number of 
managers is overstated. So, for example, in 1995 the mean of managerial employees in the sample is 6. It is not 
uncommon, though, for an enterprise to report having more than 50 managers and, in one extreme case, one 
enterprise even reported having 127 managers out of a labor force of 411. The issue of the relative number of 
employee owners is, however, more problematic. How would, for example, an enterprise where only two or 
three employees own shares be classified? Kruse and Blasi (1997) argue that at least 50% of employees have to 
own shares for the enterprise to be considered employee owned. This definition is a bit restrictive as it excludes 
enterprises with substantial employee ownership. For the purposes of this study an enterprise is classified as 
employee owned when more than 10% of employees and no less than 5 employees own shares. If these 
conditions are not satisfied then the enterprise is classified as manager owned. In sum, managerial holdings are 
defined as the sum of direct shareholdings of managerial employees, as indicated by the respondents, and of 
direct holdings of non-managerial employees if these comprise less than 10% of the total number of non-
managerial employees.    
 
The last, but not the least, problem is the distinction among different owners that make up the domestic outsider 
group. Two groups of domestic outsider owners emerge from the data: institutional domestic outsiders, i.e. other 
Estonian enterprises and institutions, and individual domestic outsiders. This distinction might not be of 
relevance if individual outside investors were “real” outsiders, i.e., they were private individuals who had 
invested in the enterprise due to financial considerations and would, consequently, display behavior not different 
from any institutional investor. Yet, quite often, individual investors are people who either have been previously 
employed by the enterprise or have close connections with enterprise insiders. In this context, former employees 
are of particularly practical importance. They are often the cause why ownership structure might change, i.e. an 
enterprise might be shown that it jumps from insider owned to outsider owned, without any single share 
changing hands. This is the case because when employees either retire or quit the enterprise, but still hold their 
shares, they are then re-classified as outsiders instead of insiders. Nevertheless, even after leaving the enterprise, 
it would be hard to conjecture them behaving as “real” outsiders and they would rather display behavior similar 
                                                 
17 When privatization through auctions started, domestic outsiders had the possibility to pay by installments and 
through vouchers, while foreigners did not have this possibility. Later on, this was changed, but, in the 
meantime, it created incentives for foreigners to bypass the law and acquire enterprises through established 
domestic holdings. 
18 Kalmi (2002) presents some evidence of this phenomenon occurring in the privatization of state and collective 
farms. 
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to that of their former peers19. This scenario has strong implications for enterprises where former employees 
dominate domestic outsider shareholding. These enterprises will more likely display behavior similar to that of 
insider owned ones than to that of “real” outsider owned ones.   
 
Thus, it becomes important to distinguish the identities of individual investors and separate former employees 
from the rest. This is not an easy undertaking as, neither the number of individual shareholders nor their 
connections to the enterprise are known. Starting with the assumption that outsider ownership closely connected 
with insider ownership always occurs jointly with insider ownership, we classify an enterprise as owned by 
former employees if all of the following four conditions20 apply in a given year: 1) the dominant owners are 
domestic outsiders; 2) domestic individual owners own a larger share than domestic institutions; 3) insiders, i.e., 
managers plus employees, initially, i.e., at the time of privatization, owned more than 50% of shares; 4) they still 
own more than 10% of shares. If any of these conditions is not satisfied then the enterprise is classified as owned 
by domestic outsiders.        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
19 This does not however preclude the possibility that they, for example, might ally themselves with a core 
institutional investor or other individual investors and, consequently, exercise their ownership and control rights 
as “real” outsiders. 
20 These criteria are selected among alternative definitions such as to minimize errors. This does not mean, 
however, that all errors are eliminated and we acknowledge that there are errors in both directions. 
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